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I. INTRODUCTION 
Even the materialist who asserts that all mental events are physical events 
in the brain must begin with some reasonably clear and determinate 
concept of what a mental event is. How else would anyone, including the 
materialist himself, know what he is talking about? Thus, J. J. C. Smart 
begins his exposition and defense of the identity theory of mind with what 
seems at least like an informal characterization of his subject matter: 
Suppose that I report that I am having an orange-yellow roundish after-image .... 
There seems to be some element of 'pure inner experience' which is being reported, 
and to which only I have direct access. You can observe my behaviour, but only I can 
be aware of my own after-image or my own pain....i 
And U. T. Place, another prominent proponent of the identity theory, 
follows a similar route: 
For our present purposes, however, I shall assume.., that statements about pains and 
twinges, about how things look, sound, and feel, about things dreamed of or pictures 
in the mind's eye, are statements referring to events and processes which are in some 
sense private or internal to the individual of whom they are predicated. 2 
These characterizations of mental events are similar in that they both 
make use of such essentially epistemic concepts as privacy and direct 
accessibility; and when Smart and Place claim that mental events are 
brain events, they must be understood as claiming that events with these 
properties are brain events. And unless the existence of mental events is 
denied, which is not likely, these materialists are committed to the thesis, 
which might seem absurd, that certain physico-chemical events inside the 
skull have the properties of privacy and direct accessibility. 
The problem of course is that once a certain property is designated as 
the defining characteristic of mental events, this definitional act may by 
itself exclude certain forms of materialism (and certain forms of idealism, 
too), such as the identity theory. Clearly, if we define 'mental event' by a 
certain property (e.g., privileged access in some sense) and then define 
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'physical event' as those events lacking it, or conversely define 'physical 
event' by a certain property (e.g., having a location in space) and 'mental 
event' as those lacking it, then the identification of the mental with the 
physical becomes hopeless; it no longer is an open possibility. To avoid 
this the mind-body theorist may begin with two logically independent 
criteria, one for marking 'mental' from 'nonmental' and the other for 
marking 'physical' from 'non-physical'; he could then go on to ponder the 
question of identity of the mental with the physical. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the problem of characterizing 
the mental and the physical within a materialist framework - more 
specifically, the framework of the identity theory. In particular, we shall 
look into the three major ways of drawing the mental-physical distinction 
and their implications for the identity theory; the three I have in mind 
are, as we shall call them, 'the intentionality criterion', 'the nonspatiality 
criterion', and 'the epistemic criterion'. Other criteria have been used to 
demarcate the mental from the physical, such as 'purposiveness', 'unity', 
and 'emergence'; these, however, will not be discussed since they seem 
much less central to the concept of mental current in philosophical 
discussion today, and they do not seem to have been formulated as 
clearly or as much in detail as the three to be discussed. Also, we shall, 
as a rule, not be concerned with the details of the particular formulations 
that have been given of the three criteria except those that directly affect 
the issue of materialism; whether these criteria can ultimately be made 
to work depends of course on those details. 
Before we enter into the discussion of substantive issues, we should 
note the fact that the materialist need not provide logically independent 
criteria for the mental and the physical. Whether he must depends on the 
categorial nature of the entities which are characterized as mental or 
physical; in particular, by drawing a mental-physical distinction with 
respect to linguistic expressions, the materialist may formulate a linguistic 
version of the identity theory to the effect that whatever is 'described' 
by a mental expression is also describable by a physical expression, or 
that a 'complete description' of the world can be given in physical 
language, z Since he is not saying that mental expressions are identical 
with physical expressions, there is no need for independent definitions of 
'mental expression' and 'physical expression'. Thus, two different 
approaches toward a characterization of the mental and the physical 
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can be distinguished: the linguistic approach attempts to characterize 
linguistic units (predicates, sentences, languages, etc.) as mental or 
physical, and the ontological approach deals directly with nonlinguistic 
entities such as events, states, properties, and facts, and attempt to pick 
out those that are mental and those that are physical. As we shall see, 
the linguistic approach is at least as common in the literature as the 
ontological approach. In the final section of this paper, we shall remark 
on some aspects of  these two approaches. 
II .  THE C R I T E R I O N  OF I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y  
In a well-known passage in his Psychologic vom empirisehen Standpunkt, 
Brentano claimed that mental phenomena can be characterized by "the 
intentional inexistence of an object" or "the reference to a content, a 
direction upon an object". He writes: 
This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No 
physical phenomenon manifests anything similar. Consequently, we can define mental 
phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as include an object intentionally 
within themselves. 4 
Brentano's approach is ontological; he is stating a defining characteristic 
for mental phenomena, not mentalistic expressions or sentences. More- 
over, Brentano's observation that "no physical phenomenon manifests 
anything similar" suggests a definition of  'physical' as 'nonmental' .  And 
under these definitions of 'mental' and 'physical', the identity theory 
would be ruled out as a logical possibility, unless of course there were no 
mental events, making the theory a vacuous truth. 
Modern defenders of Brentano's thesis of  intentionality, however, 
have taken a linguistic approach; notably, Roderick M. Chisholm, who 
is largely responsible for the current interest in intentionality, has given 
it many elaborate linguistic formulations which avoid entanglements 
with 'intentionally inexistent objects' and other metaphysical issues 
immaterial to the problem of  characterizing the mental. According to 
Chisholm, intentionality is to be taken as a logico-grammatical property 
of expressions, principally sentences, and what is to be characterized by 
the help of this concept is not the concept of mental phenomenon but 
rather that of  mental or psychological sentence. Our primary concern here 
is not with the specific formulations of the intentionality criterion of 
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psychological sentence that  Chisholm has p roposed ;  rather,  our  interest 
lies in the thesis (Chisholm calls it "Bren tano ' s  thesis ' '5)  abou t  the 
relation o f  the mental  to the physical tha t  is stated and defended on the 
basis o f  the intentionali ty criterion. 
In  Perceiving: A Philosophical Study Chisholm states three condit ions 
each of  which is claimed to be a sufficient condit ion for  a ' s imple '  or 
' n o n - c o m p o u n d '  sentence's being an intentional sentence. There  is no 
need for  going into the details o f  the three conditions, bu t  the ideas 
underlying them are by now familiar;  first, certain prima facie psycho- 
logical sentences (e.g., 'Ponce de Leon  sought  the fountain  of  youth ' )  
contain referring expressions whose success of  reference is immater ia l  to 
the t ruth or  falsity of  the containing sentences; second, some putat ive 
psychological sentences (e.g., ' I  hope  it will snow tomor row ' )  have nested 
sentential clauses whose t ruth or  falsity is independent  o f  the t ruth-value 
o f  the containing sentences; and, finally, substitutivity of  identity fails 
in sentences containing 'verbs of  proposi t ional  at t i tudes ' .  Now,  according 
to Chisholm, intentionali ty thus defined is not  exclusively a characteristic 
o f  psychological  sentences, i.e., sentences 'describing'  psychological  
phenomena ;  nor  does he explicitly claim that  all sentences abou t  psycho-  
logical p h e n o m e n a  are characterized by intentionality.  His thesis ra ther  
is that  any intent ional  sentence which p r ima  facie is not  abou t  a psycho- 
logical phenomenon  can be ' t r ans fo rmed '  into a non-intent ional  one. To  
quote  Chisholm:  
Let us say (1) that we do not need to use intentional sentences when we describe non- 
psychological phenomena; we can express all of our beliefs about what is merely 
'physical' in sentences which are not intentional. But (2) when we wish to describe 
perceiving, assuming, believing, knowing, wanting, hoping, and other such attitudes, 
then either (a) we must use sentences which are intentional or (b) we must use terms 
we do not need to use when we describe nonpsychological phenomena. 6 
Ignor ing (2-b), which is intended to prohibi t  the introduct ion of  artifici- 
ally defined expressions such as 'deer-inclusive'  as in 'His  perceptual  en- 
v i ronment  is deer-inclusive' as a way of  avoiding the intentional  sentence 
' H e  perceives a deer' ,  the thesis - we shall call it ' the Brentano-Chisholm 
thesis '  - comes to this: 
The Brentano-Chisholm thesis: (1) Every physical phenomenon is describable by a 
nonintentional sentence. (2) No mental phenomenon involving psychological attitudes 
such as wanting, believing, and knowing can be described by a nonintentional sentence. 
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As stated, a full criterion of the mental or the physical cannot be extracted 
from this thesis, since it leaves open the possibility of mental phenomena 
that are describable nonintentionally. But an anti-materialist conse- 
quence follows from it nonetheless; the Brentano-Chisholm thesis 
implies that mental phenomena involving beliefs, wants, etc. are not 
physical phenomena. 
In his entry on 'Intentionality' in The Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, 
Chisholm makes things more explicit: 
Some now believe that the thesis can be defended by reference to the language we use 
in describing psychological phenomena - that the sentences we must use in describing 
psychological phenomena have certain logical properties that are not shared by any 
of the sentences we must use in describing nonpsychological phenomena, and that 
these properties are correctly called intentional. If this view is true, then the basic 
thesis of physicalism and the unity of science is false. 7 
The thesis has now been extended to all psychological phenomena, making 
possible a full-fledged criterion of 'psychological sentence', and the anti- 
materialist implication is explicitly drawn. Clearly, if the situation is as 
described, the identity theory cannot be true, since physical events pos- 
sess, and mental events lack, the property of describability by non- 
intentional sentences. 
The key question in evaluating the Brentano-Chisholm thesis centers 
on the notion of 'description'; Chisholm's arguments in its support will 
be seen to involve a questionable assumption about this notion which 
would seem to weaken them considerably. First of all, how does he argue 
that every physical phenomenon is describable in nonintentional terms ? 
Chisholm's procedure is to choose some typical intentional sentences 
which, intuitively, describe physical phenomena, for example, 'This 
weapon, suitably placed, is capable of causing the destruction of Boston,' 
and show that 'we can readily transform them into others' 8 that are not 
intentional. But what does ' transform' mean? What counts as correct 
transformation and what counts as incorrect transformation? More 
specifically, if a sentence S is transformed into S' in the intended sense, 
what property of S must be preserved and transmitted to S'? There is a 
short and uninformative answer: S and S' must describe the same 
phenomenon. But this does not fully enlighten us; we must go on to ask: 
Under what conditions do two sentences describe the same phenomenon? 
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When we examine the actual cases of such 'transformation' in Chis- 
holm, it becomes fairly clear that the required relationship between the 
two sentences S and S' is something like logical equivalence or synonymy; 
one must be 'analyzable' into the other, and their biconditional must be 
analytic. This interpretation gains strength when Chisholm's argument 
for the other half of the thesis, i.e., that no psychological attitudes can 
be described nonintentionally, is examined. What Chisholm does here is 
essentially to show that no 'definitions' or 'translations' (Chisholm's 
terms) untainted by intentionality are possible for such psychological 
sentences as 'A man perceives an object x', 'S expects E to occur', and 
sentences about believingP Thus, what is shown is not that no psychologi- 
cal phenomenon is describable nonintentionally, but the different thesis 
that no intentional psychological sentence has a nonintentional logical 
equivalent. The latter thesis by itself does not entail the former, and 
without the former the anti-materialist implication does not follow. And 
the entailment plausibly obtains only if  one introduces the further 
premiss, tacitly assumed by Chisholm, that if two sentences are not 
logically equivalent they do not describe the same phenomenon, or, what 
is the same, sentences describing the same phenomenon are logically 
equivalent. 
The problem of sentential descriptions of events - and the broader 
problem of the individuation of events - is one that has only recently 
come to philosophical attention and about which relatively little can be 
said that is uncontroversial. 1° But it will be granted that logical equiva- 
lence is much too strong a requirement on the sameness of the event 
described by sentences; few will hesitate to say that 'Socrates drank 
hemlock' and 'Xantippe's husband drank hemlock' describe one and the 
same event - or 'phenomenon' if you like. And the contemporary defen- 
ders of materialism have been careful! to set their position apart from 
the already discredited claim that sentences about psychological events 
are definable in terms of, or translatable into, purely physicalistic 
expressions; their criterion of event individuation clearly excludes logical 
equivalence as a necessary condition of the identity of the event described. 
Thus, Chisholm's argument at best shows the inadequacy of the thesis 
of physicalistic definability or translatability of mentalistic terms - that 
is, the so-called logical behaviorism - which was defended by some logical 
positivists in the 1930's11; it does not affect the more interesting form of 
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materialism, namely the identity theory, which asserts only a contingent 
identity of the mental with the physical; nor does it touch the sort of 
reductive physicalism and unity of science enunciated by Oppenheim and 
Putnam. 1~ 
Thus, the implementation of the first part of the Brentano-Chisholm 
program, i.e., that of finding a 'formal' or 'logical' property of psycholog- 
ical sentences, has no adverse effect on the identity theory, unless it is 
supplemented by an unrealistically stringent criterion of event individua- 
tion. Our point, in fact, seems applicable to all linguistic approaches to the 
mental-physical distinction: no reasonable definitions of 'psychological 
sentence' and 'physical sentence' can a priori exclude the identity theory 
in the form of the thesis that what is described by a psychological sentence 
is also describable by a physical sentence, unless it is accompanied by 
some unrealistic criterion of event individuation. 
In any case, it is not certain that the program of defining 'psychological 
sentence' in terms of some logico-grammatical properties of sentences 
has succeeded or will succeed. On the face of it, if there were such proper- 
ties, it would be a fantastic fact that would require a philosophical and 
linguistic explanation; we are used to thinking of the relation between 
language and the world as conventional, at least to an important extent, 
and it would be surprising if we discovered that there was a strict cor- 
respondence between some logical property of sentences and whether 
these sentences are about (designate, describe, pertain to, etc.) psychological 
phenomena. The mass of counterexamples18 against Chisholm's ingenious 
formulations of the intentionality criterion and the resulting complexity 
ot Chisholm's more recent efforts 14 reinforce this impression. Another 
important reason for the scepticism is the inherent vagueness in the notion 
of a sentence being about some psychological phenomenon (for example, 
is 'There are no pains' about some psychological phenomenon?), and 
unless more is said to clarify this concept it would be premature to 
expect an exact correspondence between it and some very precisely 
defined formal logical property of sentences. 
III. THE CRITERION OF NONSPATIALITY 
Apparently, the idea that what is mental lacks spatial dimensions orig- 
inates with Descartes who, in a famous passage, wrote: 
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But although any one attribute is sufficient to give us a knowledge of substance, there 
is always one principal property of substance which constitutes its nature and essence, 
and on which all the others depend. Thus extension in length, breadth and depth, 
constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of 
thinking substance. For all else that may be attributed to body presupposes extension, 
and is but a mode of this extended thing; as everything that we find in mind is but so 
many diverse forms of thinking. 15 
As  far  as I know,  Descar tes  never explici t ly said tha t  minds  are no t  in 
space, a l though certain doctr ines  of  his, no tab ly  one tha t  denies mo t ion  
to menta l  substance,  seem to entai l  i t ;  in any  event, all tha t  the  above  
passage implies  is tha t  minds  do no t  have extension,  i.e., three-dimen-  
sional  bulk.  As  is well known,  he said tha t  " the  seat o f  the sou l"  is in 
the  p ineal  g land 16, locat ing here " the  act ions  o f  the m i n d . "  I t  is in- 
terest ing to  note  tha t  Leibniz  in terpre ted  Descar tes  as saying tha t  the 
mind  has  a spat ia l  loca t ion  in the body.  In  New Essays on Human 
Understanding Leibniz  dist inguishes three kinds o f  " u b e i t y "  or  " m o d e s  
o f  existing somewhere" .  The  first k ind  is called ' c i rcumscr ip t ive '  and  
character izes  the manner  in which mater ia l  bodies  are in space;  they  
are  there "punctatim, in such wise tha t  they are measures  according  to 
which we can assign the po in ts  o f  the th ing p laced  cor responding  to  the 
poin ts  o f  space. 'u7 Of  the second k ind  o f  ubei ty  and the loca t ion  o f  the 
soul,  Leibniz  wri tes:  
The second [kind of ubeity] is the definitive, when we can define, i.e., determine, that 
the situated thing is in such a space, without being able to assign the precise points or 
the peculiar places exclusive of what is there. Thus it has been considered that the soul 
is in the body, not supposing it possible to assign a precise point at which the soul 
or some portion of the soul is, without its being also at some other point .... It is true 
that Descartes desired to place narrower limits to the soul by locating it properly in the 
pineal gland. Nevertheless he did not dare to say that it is exclusively at a certain point 
in this gland; and this not being so he gains nothing, and it is in this respect precisely 
as if he gave it the entire body as its prison or place. 18 
The th i rd  k ind  o f  ubeity,  finally, is the repletive and  is a t t r ibu ted  to 
G o d ;  bu t  this does not  concern  us here. 
Leibniz '  discussion does no t  make  i t  clear  whether  the imposs ibi l i ty  
o f  giving the soul  a precise loca t ion  in the body  indicates  an epistemic 
fact  abou t  our  abi l i ty  to do so or  an onto logica l  fact  abou t  the object ive 
inde te rminacy  o f  the soul ' s  spat ia l  locat ion.  I t  is difficult to under s t and  
h o w  any object can have an object ively inde termina te  loca t ion  within a 
reg ion  o f  space in which i t  is supposed to be loca ted;  i f  the soul  is in the 
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body, it must be in either the lower half of the body or the upper half - 
or else it could not be in the body at all; if it is in the upper half, then it 
must be in either its upper half or lower half; and so on ad infinitum. 
On the other hand, if the definitive ubeity of the soul is supposed to 
reflect our inability to find the exact location of the soul, it is unclear 
how we are able to locate the soul in the body to begin with. 
Minds as substantive entities have largely disappeared from contem- 
porary discussions of the mind-body problem, and those who concern 
themselves with the question of the spatiality of the mental attend 
chiefly to mental events, states, processes, and the like. Some have argued 
that mental events are not in space at all; for example, Norman Mal- 
colm 19 has claimed that it makes no sense to speak of "the bodily 
location of a thought" since there is, and can be, no intelligible test or 
criterion to determine the location of mental events in the body over and 
beyond a test for determining the location of the correlated neurological 
events; in saying this, Malcolm seems to have gone further than the 
classical dualists like Descartes and Leibniz. There are others who, like 
Leibniz, have argued that although mental events are located where one's 
body is located, they cannot be given precise specific locations within the 
body. 20 On either view the identity theory would be impossible - that is, 
on the assumption that the appropriate bodily events with which mental 
events are to be identified have precise location in the body; under the 
identity theory, mental events too must have "circumscriptive ubeity" if 
physical events do. 
A third possible view is that mental events have a precise location in 
the body but at the present time we are unable to pinpoint their exact 
location; thus, on this view, mental events have "circumscriptive ubeity", 
objectively speaking, but epistemologically we can attribute to them only 
'definitive ubeity'. Such a view is held by Anthony Quinton 21 who thinks 
that mental events "have at least a rough position in space of a kind 
which here, as in other cases, scientific inquiry may render more precise."z2 
But why should we think that mental events have even 'rough position' 
in space? Quinton's answer is that they must have spatial location if they 
are properly to be 'individuated'. Consider the following situation: Two 
persons A and B simultaneously experience qualitatively indistinguishable 
feelings of annoyance at a whistling noise in their vicinity. How do we 
justify, Quinton asks, our belief that there are here two experiences and 
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not one? Can we individuate the two mental events by the descriptions 
'the experience caused by the noise in A's hearing' and 'the experience 
caused by the noise in B's hearing'? Quinton thinks not: "These two 
descriptions do not entail duality of reference. One and the same window 
can be broken by two bricks hitting it simultaneously. ''28 Quinton's 
answer is that the two experiences are different in virtue of the different 
places at which they occur. 
This argument needs examination. For Quinton's own solution to be 
adequate the descriptions 'the event E occurring at place p' and 'the event 
E' occurring at place q', together with the further assumption that p is 
different from q, must entail that E is different from E'; that is to say, it 
must be the case that events occurring at different places are different. 
But is this true? A house can be in both North Dakota and South Dakota; 
if this house goes up in fire, the fire occurs in both North Dakota and 
South Dakota. One might protest that the fire that burns only in one 
of the states is different from the fire that burns only in the other. This is 
true, but not relevant; it amounts to saying that 'the fire in this house 
that burns in North Dakota but not in South Dakota' and 'the fire in this 
house that burns in South Dakota but not in North Dakota' entail 
duality of reference. Thus, Quinton's spatially individuating descriptions 
must be strengthened thus: 'the experience occurring at place p but not 
at q' and 'the experience occurring at q but not at p" (or 'the experience 
occurring a tp  but at no other place', etc.). But this is a move of which we 
could have availed ourselves earlier without spatializing mental events; 
for, clearly, the two descriptions 'the experience caused by the noise in 
A's hearing but not in B's'  and 'the experience caused by the noise in B's 
hearing but not in A's '  entail duality of reference. Apart from this crucial 
weakness in Quinton's argument, the fact that mental events must be 
individuated with respect to spatially located objects does not necessarily 
imply that mental events themselves must be entities with spatial location; 
whatever 'individuation' might precisely mean, it would seem that we 
could individuate some properties with respect to material bodies exem- 
plifying them ('the color of gold', 'the temperature of the sun's interior', 
and so on) without saying that these properties have location in space. 
In any event, given that mental events are in space, why should they be 
located in the bodies of the persons to whom they occur? Why not say 
that all my mental events, and all yours, too, occur, say, at the tip of the 
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Washington Monument? Quinton's implied answer to this is that "the 
fact that their proximate causes and effects are in these bodies makes this 
[i.e. locating them in the bodies of their owners] the obvious thing to 
do ''24 and "[by] locating the mental causes of speech and behaviour in 
the body we at least locate both cause and effect somewhere in space and 
define a region within which a possible intermediary mechanism could be 
found." 95 This is an interesting idea, and I believe that causal considera- 
tions of this sort were operative in Descartes' thinking when he placed 
'the actions of the soul' in the pineal gland. 26 The idea is that cause and 
effect must be spatially contiguous, or at least must have a spatially 
contiguous intermediary mechanism. But is this not an illegitimate 
extension to mental events of a condition properly applicable only to 
physical events? If  mental events are not in space at all, the concept of 
spatial contiguity is not an intelligible notion for mental events; on the 
other hand, if they are to have location in space at all, the condition of 
contiguity could perhaps be invoked to locate them in the bodies of their 
owners 27. It is uncertain how compelling these causal considerations are, 
and, in any case, Quinton's argument fails to establish the assumption 
that mental events must have some location or other in space. 
I believe that mental events do occur in space; I reach this conclusion 
not from causal considerations of the sort discussed above, although they 
certainly provide some motivation for it, but from more general con- 
siderations about the nature of events. It is convenient to think of an 
event as the exemplifying of a certain empirical property by an object 
at a time; a physical event is the exemplifying of a physical property by 
an object at a time; and a mental event, similarly, is the exemplifying of 
a mental property by an object at a time. All the objects we know that 
exemplify mental properties are biological organisms of certain com- 
plexity, especially human bodies. The location of an event is most 
naturally and conveniently defined as identical with the location of the 
object involved in it; that is, the event of an object x's exemplifying a 
property P at time t is located where x is located at time t. From the 
assumption that mental events consist in human bodies' exemplifying 
mental properties it now follows that mental events occur where human 
bodies exemplifying them are located. Thus, the dualism of substance is 
frankly given up at the outset; to countenance nonphysical 'mental 
substances' as objects exemplifying mental properties and worry about 
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their spatial properties is already to have abandoned hope for a materialist 
account of man; under the monism of substance and the account of 
events and their locations given here, mental events turn out to have 
locations in the same sense in which physical events do. The location of 
an event, whether mental or physical, is derivative on the location of 
material objects. 28 
What now of the argument that brain events with which mental events 
are identified can be given specific locations inside the body whereas on 
the present account the location of  all mental events is the entire body? 
Even if mental events are conceded to have location in space, the identity 
theory still would be false since their location does not coincide with the 
location of brain events. The proper reply to this objection is that it all 
depends on what one means by 'brain event'. According to the present 
account, my body's being in pain is identical with my body's being in 
brain state B, and both these events are where my body is. The objection 
is based on the tacit assumption that my body's being in brain state B is 
identical with my brain's being in state B and that, as a result, these 
events are in my brain. But this we must deny; my body's being in brain 
state B is not the same event as my brain's being in state B. The event 
x's exemplifying property P at t and y's exemplifying property Q at t' 
are one and the same just in case x and y are the same object, P and Q 
are the same property, and t and t '  are the same time. To be sure, it is 
necessarily true that if the event of my body's being in brain state B 
occurs, then so does the event of my brain's being in state B; but this 
does not show them to be the same event any more than the fact that 
necessarily if Xantippe's husband exists then Xantippe exists shows 
Socrates and Xantippe are one and the same person. My body's being in 
brain state B is a 'global event' of  my body; it can no more be localized 
in some specific part of my body than the event of my body's having 
such-and-such average density. In fact, my body can have such-and-such 
average density without any specific proper part of my body having that 
particular density. 
This account of events opens a way of formulating the Cartesian idea 
of  spatiality into criteria of  the mental and the physical. Given our 
analysis of  events, what must be defined are the concepts of mental 
property and physical property; these will yield the concepts of mental 
event and physical event. As quoted earlier, Descartes wrote "All else 
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that may be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is but a mode 
of this extended thing". The following definition of 'physical property' 
would be in line with Descartes' idea. 
Property P is a physicalproperty if and only if that an object has P presupposes that it 
has extension. 
The exact import of  this criterion depends on how the controversial 
concept of presupposition is understood; it seems to me that implication 
or entailment will do here in place of presupposition. Also, 'has exten- 
sion' may be weakened into 'has location in space'. Another refinement 
is necessary if being non-black and other such 'negative properties' are 
to count as physical properties; the needed modification can be accom- 
plished by replacing the definiens by 'either that an object has P or that 
an object does not have P presupposes that it has extension'. Those who 
find the definiens of the above obscure on account of its use of the 
relation of presupposition (or implication or entailment) between 
'that'-clauses could formulate it with respect to predicates: 
Predicate P is a physicalpredicate if and only if 'x is P' presupposes 'x has extension'. 
The possible changes and refinements noted earlier apply here also. 
Could we formulate analogous definitions of 'mental property'  and 
'mental predicate'? Any object exemplifying a mental property is, as a 
matter of fact, a material body; but it is not necessarily a material body; 
on the other hand, an object exemplifying a mental property must be a 
concrete entity in time. Thus, one might try: 
Property M is a mental property if and only if that an object has M presupposes that 
it is located in time but not that it has extension in space. 
This lets in too much: lasting for two hours and coming into being before 
the birth of Christ turn out to be mental properties on this criterion. It is 
uncertain whether these and other possible counterexamples can be 
eliminated by adding further plausible conditions; it may well be that, 
within the limits set by the requirements of  the identity theory, a work- 
able criterion of  the physical is the best we can hope for from considera- 
tions of spatiality. 
Is the identity theory possible under criteria of  the mental and the 
physical along these lines? Can mental properties be identical with 
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physical properties, given these criteria? The answer seems to be in the 
affirmative: two predicates P and Q can be such that 'x is P' implies a 
sentence S, 'x is Q' does not imply it, and yet P and Q designate the same 
property. For example, 'x is blue' implies 'x is not red'; 'x has the color 
of the sky' does not imply it; but 'is blue' and 'has the color of the sky' 
designate the same property. So the criteria by themselves do not preclude 
the identification of mental with physical properties, and the identity 
theory remains as a possible theory. 
IV. THE EPISTEMIC CRITERION 
As the quotations from Smart and Place at the outset of this paper 
indicate, most philosophers now seem to favor some sort of epistemic 
criterion; the concept of mental seems today more closely associated 
with such notions as 'privileged access', 'direct awareness', and 'privacy' 
than with the more abstract notion of intentionality and the basically 
unintuitive notion of nonspatiality. And the focus of philosophical 
discussion, at least as it concerns the question of materialism, too seems 
to have shifted from the rational and cognitive aspects of the mental to 
the phenomenal and affective aspects. Whereas, for Plato, rational 
thoughts were the paradigmatic activities of the soul, such lowly events 
as itches, toothaches, and twinges are now among those typically men- 
tioned in philosophical discussion as mental events. And the identity 
theory is most often formulated as a thesis about sensations, or 'pheno- 
menal events', to the effect that all sensations are physical processes in the 
brain. ~9 In spite of the popularity of the epistemic criterion, however, 
one finds in the literature few overt attempts at a precise formulation of 
the criterion. In what follows, we shall use a proposal due to Heidel- 
berger 3° as the vehicle of our discussion. 
Stripped of inessential details and somewhat simplified, Heidelberger's 
criterion comes to this: 
A singular statement that p is psychological if and only if there exists one and only 
one person S such that S may know that p even if S has no evidence for p or S may 
know that not-p even ff S has no evidence for not-p. 
The epistemic concept used here is that of knowing without evidence; the 
idea is that one's knowledge of one's own psychological states, at least 
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those sometimes called 'phenomenal states', is direct in that it is not 
based on, or inferred from, evidence or observation. The 'private' or 
'privileged' character of such knowledge is captured in the qualification 
that there exists only one person who enjoys that sort of direct epistemic 
access. 31 Heidelberger's criterion in effect says that a psychological state- 
ment is such that either it or its denial has these two properties. The 
reason for including reference to the denial of a statement is that some 
psychological statements such as 'Jones knows that the sky is blue', 
contain a nonpsychological clause, 'The sky is blue', which it entails but 
to which no one has direct private access. But the negation of such a 
statement, 'Jones does not know that the sky is blue', can be known 
directly and with privacy since 'Jones does not believe that the sky is 
blue', which implies it, can be so known. 
It is well that Heidelberger restricts his criterion to singular statements, 
since no one person has direct and private access vis-fl-vis generalized 
psychological statements such as 'Someone is in pain' and 'Exactly five 
persons are in pain'. But not even all singular psychological statements 
satisfy Heidelberger's criterion; as an example, consider '(A & B ) v  
(C & D)', where A is 'Abe is in pain', B is 'Bob is in pain', C is 'Charlie 
is in pain', and D is 'Dick is in pain'. Heidelberger's criterion is a good 
deal more plausible when applied only to 'simple' or 'atomic' singular 
statements; it should be clear that the epistemic property of private 
direct access cannot be used to give a direct definition of 'psychological' 
for compound and generalized statements. 
But it is not at all certain that Heidelberger's criterion yields correct 
results even for noncompound singular statements which, intuitively, 
attribute some mental state to a person. A statement involving a non- 
referential singular term like 'Mr. Pickwick is in pain' is an obvious but 
unimportant counterexample; a more important kind of counterexample 
is a statement like 'The tallest man in this room is having a toothache'. 
This shows that Heidelberger's criterion does not satisfy what seems like 
a minimal condition on such a criterion that if 'a = b' is true, 'a is F '  and 
'b is F '  are together psychological or together nonpsychological. More- 
over, it is by no means clear that 'Jones is in pain' is psychological under 
the criterion; for just as Jones has to know that he is the tallest man in 
the room to know that the tallest man in the room is in pain, he must 
know that he is Jones to know that Jones is in pain; 
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The point being belabored is better appreciated if Heidelberger's cri- 
terion is recast in a formally correct form, since his formulation is for- 
really defective; as stated, it is not a definition, as can be seen from the 
fact that it does not permit the elimination of the predicate 'is a psycho- 
logical statement' from all contexts; for example, it does not permit the 
elimination of this term from 'The first statement in Descartes' cogito- 
argument is a psychological statement'. The following remedies this 
defect: 
A singular sentence P is a psychological sentence if and only 
if there exists one and only one person S such that S may 
know that P is true without evidence or S may know that 
not-P is true without evidence. 
In addition to the difficulties already mentioned which stand out more 
vividly under this formulation, there is another point to be noted: there 
is no guarantee here that logically equivalent sentences will be alike in 
point of being psychological or nonpsychological. This and some of the 
earlier difficulties are due to the special logical properties of contexts 
governed by epistemic terms; in view of the well-known problems and 
puzzles besetting such contexts, these difficulties are by no means un- 
expected. Not only do such contexts not admit of substitution of corefer- 
ential expressions but they do not allow interchange of logical equiva- 
lents; they are both opaque and 'L-opaque'. And in this respect they are 
worse behaved than contexts governed by the alethic modalities of 
necessity and possibility. 
Consider the problem of using these opaque constructions in framing 
definitions; for example, consider the use of modally qualified terms in 
defining a class: 
M----def. {X [ Necessarily, x=the  morning star}. 
This is a defective definition and does not succeed in characterizing a 
determinate class of entities; for the evening star is not a member of M, 
although the morning star, that is, the evening star, is a member of M. 
A similar problem arises for the following definition making use of a 
psychological intensional expression: 
B = def. {x ] Jones believes that x has two daughters}, 
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where we assume Jones to be a person who believes that President Nixon 
has two daughters but does not believe that the vice president under 
President Eisenhower has two daughters. And we should expect the same 
difficulty with the definition of 'mental' that makes use of the opaque 
construction 'S may know without evidence that P is true';  given two 
names or descriptions of a sentence, the sentence may be psychological 
or nonpsychological under Heidelberger's criterion depending on which 
name or description is used. 
The opacity of constructions involving epistemic terms constitutes a 
basic difficulty for any epistemic definition of 'mental'; we shall later 
indicate a way of alleviating this difficulty, but it is surprising that no 
notice has been taken of  this problem by philosophers who have favored 
an epistemic criterion of the mental. This is not to say that philosophers 
have been unaware of the opacity of epistemic constructions in connec- 
tion with the mind-body issue; in fact, this opacity has been used by the 
supporters of the identity theory to answer a familiar type of objections. 
These objections, which are conveniently called 'epistemic objections', 
are based on the observation that there are certain epistemic properties, 
such as privacy and direct accessibility, which characterize mental 
events - at least some of them - but not any physical event. Thus, one 
familiar line goes like this: "I  am directly aware of my pains but not of 
nay brain events; theretore, pains are not brain events." The reply to this 
is equally familiar: "The context 'I am directly aware that. . . '  or 'I am 
directly aware of. . . '  is opaque and does not permit substitution of 
coreferential expressions." 39. But the identity theorist whose conception 
of the mental is essentially epistemic cannot avail himself of this line of 
defense without inviting the further challenge that if 'directly aware' is 
indeed opaque, his concept of mental event is not a determinate concept 
and as a result the identity thesis itself fails to make a determinate 
assertion. 
Let us now try to formulate a workable epistemic criterion of the 
mental. Our formulation will be ontological rather than linguistic, and 
will give us a criterion of 'phenomenal property'.  Roughly speaking, a 
phenomenal property is a property associated with a mental event in 
virtue of  which the event is 'directly' apprehended; mental events clearly 
have properties, such as causal properties, that are not directly appre- 
hended. A phenomenal event is an event which consists in the exemplifica- 
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tion of a phenomenal property at a time; the notion of 'phenomenal 
event' is intended to cover events like sensations, images, and occurrent 
thoughts, but not those psychological states involving dispositions like 
desires and motives; it will be granted that our epistemic position 
vis-d-vis these states is not in principle superior to anyone else's. 
Property F is a phenomenal property if and only if for any S 
if S exemplifies F, S is the only person who is directly aware 
that S exemplifies F. 
The variable 'F '  appears both inside and outside the opaque construction 
involving 'directly aware'. It might be argued that while the definiens is 
satisfied when 'pain' replaces 'F '  it is not satisfied when 'F '  is replaced by 
'the mental property nomically coextensive with the stimulation of the 
hypothalamus' even if this latter expression refers to pain. Similar com- 
ments apply also to the variable 'S'. To minimize this sort of difficulty 
we can use a simple device analogous to one used by E. J. Lemmon. ~3 
Recall the defective definition of class M above; this can be amended thus: 
M= dee. {X l (3 y) (x=y & necessarily y = t h e  morning star)}. 
Using a similar device we have: 
Property F is a phenomenal property if and only if for any S, 
if S exemplifies F, there exists S' and F '  such that S=S', 
F=F', and S is the only person who is directly aware that 
S' exemplifies F' .  
It  is not certain that this device eliminates all the objectionable features 
of the opaque construction in question, but it helps us avoid the obvious 
pitfalls. 
I have used 'directly aware' without a detailed explanation of its 
meaning; in fact, I am using it as a catchall term for privileged epistemic 
access. My formulation of the epistemic criterion, therefore, is best taken 
as giving only a form in which specific epistemic criteria can be stated; 
it will yield different criteria depending on exactly how 'directly aware' is 
understood. In particular, the clause 'S is directly aware that S' exempli- 
fies F "  can be replaced by others to suit one's predilections; for example, 
one could use the notion of 'knowledge without evidence' by replacing 
'S is directly aware' with 'S is in a position to know without evidence'; or 
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we could use the weaker condition 'if S believes that S '  exemplifies F ' ,  
then S would be maximally justified in this belief', z4 There are two 
features of my formulation which may be worth noting: first, the use of  a 
device to circumvent the opacity of epistemic expressions, and second, 
the fact that the criterion is stated for properties, not for such more 
inclusive units as states and propositions. 
How this concept of phenomenal property can be extended into a 
general concept of  mental property is a question into which we cannot 
enter here; but a hint as to the direction such an extension might take is 
contained in the idea that the ascription of a mental property to an object 
not directly involving a phenomenal state implies that the object to 
which it is ascribed has been or is or will be in some phenomenal state if 
certain specified conditions are realized; thus, to say that a person wants 
some object x is to say, in part, that he will be pleased when he believes 
that he has x. 35 In fact, the property of being directly aware used in our 
formulation of the epistemic criterion does not seem to qualify as a 
phenomenal property under it; it usually is not the case that when I 
am directly aware of something, I am directly aware that I am directly 
aware; there is a well-known infinite regress that threatens to get started 
here. Thus, direct awareness (whatever its precise interpretation may 
be) is likely to be counted in the broader class of  mental properties, 
not in that of phenomenal properties. 
V. C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S  
The problem of characterizing the intentionality of sentences and its 
possible connection with the psychological subject matter of these 
sentences is a fascinating problem; but as I noted earlier, there is reason 
to be sceptical about the success of this project, and it would be wrong 
to pin on it our hope for a criterion of the mental. I think we can be 
rather more hopeful with regard to the other two major criteria. The 
epistemic criterion could give us a viable concept of the mental - at least, 
the concept of the phenomenal which is sufficient for stating the currently 
fashionable versions of the identity theory; and the spatiality criterion 
could give us a workable concept of  the physical. It  seems to me that 
this is the correct approach; the epistemic criterion, which is intended to 
capture one facet of the concept of consciousness, seems well suited for 
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delineating those events which the identity theorist is anxious to identify 
with brain events; and the spatiality criterion of the physical is consonant 
with our idea of the physical as that which belongs in the intersubjective 
space-time network. 36 
I shall conclude with a few remarks about the two approaches toward a 
criterion of the mental that we have distinguished, namely the ontological 
and the linguistic. We should note first that an ontological criterion does 
not automatically yield a linguistic criterion, nor conversely. That  is, 
we cannot simply assume that an expression is mental if it describes, 
refers to, or designates something that is mental, or, conversely, that if 
something is designated or described by a mental expression it must be 
a mental entity. The very possibility of  the identity theory is contingent 
on the falsity of the first; or consider 'the nonphysical event nomically 
coextensive with the stimulation of the hypothalamus'. Similar con- 
structions will show that the second assumption is equally faulty. In fact, 
the idea that a psychological sentence 'describes' a psychological pheno- 
menon is not a clear idea at all. Does the sentence 'There are no pains' 
describe a psychological phenomenon? I think it is a mistake for some- 
one looking for a linguistic formulation to attempt to tackle sentences 
as the basic units of classification into mental and nonmental. We have 
two conflicting intuitions about what is to count as a psychological 
sentence which are not easily reconciled: on the one hand, a psychological 
sentence is one that contains psychological expressions essentially, and 
on the other, a psychological sentence is one that, in some sense, de- 
scribes a psychological phenomenon. 'There are no pains' will count as 
psychological under the first, but presumably not under the second; and 
if the identity theory is true, sentences that are not psychological in the 
first sense will describe psychological phenomena. I think we should be 
better off tackling predicates, rather than sentences, in formulating a 
linguistic criterion of the mental or the physical. As will be recalled, all 
the authors we have mentioned in this paper who take the linguistic 
approach attempt to work with full sentences. 
Another pitfall with the linguistic approach is the temptation to use 
some sort of logical relationship between sentences as a closure condition 
on the class of  psychological sentences as a way of enlarging it; thus, 
Chisholm explicitly accepts at one point the principle that a consistent 
sentence implying a psychological sentence is itself psychologicalY This 
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would be a tempting course if, as is likely, a given definition of 'psycho- 
logical sentence' does not directly classify, e.g., 'Jones knows that snow 
is white' as psychological while it does so classify 'Jones believes that 
snow is white'. There are other logical closure conditions that at the 
firat blush look equally tempting. But we must be extremely cautious with 
these conditions; even Chisholm's seemingly plausible closure condition 
yields what seems to be an unacceptable consequence that  'There are no 
men '  is psychological since it implies 'No  man believes that unicorns 
exist' which is psychological by Chisholm's intentionality criterion. In 
another place Chisholm accepts the condition that a compound sentence 
is psychological if one of its components is. z8 The combination of  these 
two conditions would lead to the disastrous consequence that every 
sentence is psychological if  at least one is. 
I point out these difficulties with the linguistic formulations because 
they seem to indicate that  the notion of 'psychological sentence', even if 
we had a clear notion of  'psychological predicate', is neither very clear 
nor very useful. And in view of the difficulty alluded to earlier of  ex- 
plicating the notion of a sentence describing an event or phenomenon, 
much more would have to be said to clarify the linguistic versions of  
materialism which typically assert something like "Everything described 
by a mentalistic sentence can be described by a physicalistic sentence". 
An ontological criterion that  directly deals with mental and physical 
entities is free f rom these difficulties, and should therefore be preferred 
to a linguistic one, ceterisparibus, za 
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